Arbeitspapier

Negotiating climate change as a social situation

This paper applies the theory of social situations to international environmental agreements on greenhouse gas emission reduction. The usual pessimism on the size of stable coalitions among world regions is challenged for two alternative cases, namely by introducing farsightedness and by introducing coalitional moves with commitment. This is an extension of stability in the cartel game, where a cartel symbolises a coalition among world regions for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. It is a special case of the commitment situation, which has been proposed in the theory of social situations. The results are obtained by restricting the move rules in the game among world regions.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 44.2001

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
International Policy Coordination and Transmission
Thema
Coalitions
coalitional moves
cooperation
theory of social situations
international negotiations
climate change
Klimaschutz
Internationale Umweltpolitik
Verhandlungen
Theorie
Nichtkooperatives Spiel

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Lise, Wietze
Tol, Richard S. J.
van der Zwaan, Bob
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2001

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Lise, Wietze
  • Tol, Richard S. J.
  • van der Zwaan, Bob
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2001

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