Negotiating climate change as a social situation

Arbeitspapier

This paper applies the theory of social situations to international environmental agreements on greenhouse gas emission reduction. The usual pessimism on the size of stable coalitions among world regions is challenged for two alternative cases, namely by introducing farsightedness and by introducing coalitional moves with commitment. This is an extension of stability in the cartel game, where a cartel symbolises a coalition among world regions for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. It is a special case of the commitment situation, which has been proposed in the theory of social situations. The results are obtained by restricting the move rules in the game among world regions.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 44.2001

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; International Policy Coordination and Transmission
• Subject: Coalitions ; coalitional moves ; cooperation ; theory of social situations ; international negotiations ; climate change ; Klimaschutz ; Internationale Umweltpolitik ; Verhandlungen ; Theorie ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Lise, Wietze ; Tol, Richard S. J. ; van der Zwaan, Bob
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 2001

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/155207
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET