Imperfect information, wage formation, and the employability of the unemployed

Arbeitspapier

This paper considers the optimal hiring strategy of a firm that is unable to observe the productive abilities of all its applicants. Whom the firm considers as hireable, will depend crucially on the extent to which the firm can use its wage setting to mirror productivity differences. However, when setting its wages the firm has to consider other factors as well, e.g. turnover, that may make it optimal not to set wages that fully reflect productivity differences. Instead, it may be optimal to avoid hiring workers that have certain characteristics; i.e. to use a discriminatory hiring strategy. In the paper it is shown that discrimination based on employment status is an equilibrium hiring strategy even when the firm is free to set different wages for workers with different expected productivities. It is also shown that if all firms use such hiring procedures this will have strong implications for the aggregate economy and welfare.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2002:17

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity ; Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search ; Labor Discrimination
• Thema: Hiring ; imperfect information ; discrimination ; employed job seekers ; efficiency wages ; turnover ; unemployment ; welfare ; policy

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Eriksson, Stefan
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU)
• (wo): Uppsala
• (wann): 2002

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/82220
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ