Arbeitspapier
An experiment on non-zero sum Colonel Blotto games
We study a version of the Colonel Blotto game where valuations across battlefields are heterogeneous and asymmetric. These games can exhibit unique pure strategy equilibria, some of which are non-monotonic with respect to the battlefield valuations. We test our theoretical predictions in the laboratory and find low initial levels of equilibrium play but substantial learning throughout the experiment. Learning is higher for games with monotonic equilibria. Finally, we find that deviations from equilibrium predictions benefit aggregate welfare.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 779
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
- Thema
-
Colonel Blotto
Non-zero sum
Experiments
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hortala-Vallve, Rafael
Llorente-Saguer, Aniol
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
- (wo)
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London
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hortala-Vallve, Rafael
- Llorente-Saguer, Aniol
- Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
Entstanden
- 2015