Arbeitspapier

One-way Flow Networks: the Role of Heterogeneity

I study a one-way flow connections model in which players are heterogeneous with respect to values and the costs of establishing a link. I first show that values and costs asymmetries are crucial in determining the level of connectedness of a network. Interestingly, unconnected equilibria are asymmetric and central players may emerge. Second, I show that non-singleton components have a wheel architecture as far as the costs of linking are not partner specific. Otherwise also the flower architecture constitutes an equilibrium. I interpret these results as saying that asymmetric connections across players are a peculiar feature of homogeneous environments; by contrast, in heterogeneous settings players hold asymmetric connections, which are accompanied by the emergence of central players.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 04-031/1

Classification
Wirtschaft
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Noncooperative Games
Subject
Networks
heterogeneity
Netzwerk
Spieltheorie
Theorie
Soziales Netzwerk

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Galeotti, Andrea
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Tinbergen Institute
(where)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(when)
2004

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Galeotti, Andrea
  • Tinbergen Institute

Time of origin

  • 2004

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