Arbeitspapier
Expansion of higher education and time-consistent taxation
This paper analyzes educational choices and political support for subsidies to higher education in the presence of a time-consistency problem in income redistribution. There may be political support for so generous subsidization that it motivates the median voter to obtain higher education. As a result of increasing own income, the median voter prefers in the future lower taxes than without higher education. Therefore, the expansion of participation in higher education during the second half of the 20th century may have partly been driven by the aim to limit the political support for overly generous income redistribution.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2101
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
National Government Expenditures and Education
Educational Finance; Financial Aid
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Subject
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Hochschule
Bildungsverhalten
Einkommensumverteilung
Zeitkonsistenz
Median Voter
Bildungspolitik
Steuer
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Poutvaara, Panu
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2007
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Poutvaara, Panu
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2007