Arbeitspapier

Austerity

We shed light on the function, properties and optimal size of austerity using the standard sovereign debt model augmented to include incomplete information about credit risk. Austerity is defined as the shortfall of consumption from the level desired by a country and supported by its repayment capacity. We find that austerity serves as a tool for securing a more favourable loan package; that it is associated with over-investment even when investment does not create collateral; and that low risk borrowers may favour more to less severe austerity. These findings imply that the amount of fresh funds obtained by a sovereign is not a reliable measure of austerity suffered; and that austerity may actually be associated with higher growth. Our analysis accommodates costly signalling for gaining credibility and also assigns a novel role to spending multipliers in the determination of optimal austerity.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 14.07

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
International Lending and Debt Problems
National Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
Thema
Austerity
credit rationing
default
incomplete information
investment
growth
pooling equilibrium
separating equilibrium
Haushaltskonsolidierung
Öffentliche Schulden
Gleichgewichtsmodell
Kreditrisiko
Unvollkommene Information
Kreditrationierung
Investition
Wirtschaftswachstum
Staatsbankrott
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dellas, Harris
Niepelt, Dirk
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee
(wo)
Gerzensee
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dellas, Harris
  • Niepelt, Dirk
  • Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee

Entstanden

  • 2014

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