Platform Standards, Collusion and Quality Incentives

Arbeitspapier

This paper examines how quality incentives are related to the interoperability of competing platforms. Platforms choose whether to operate standardised or exclusively, prior to quality and subsequent price competition. We find that platforms choose a common standard if they can coordinate their quality provision. The actual investment then depends on the cost of quality provision: If rather high, platforms refrain from investment; if rather low, platforms maintain vertically differentiated platforms. The latter case is socially more desirable than exclusivity where platforms do not invest. Nevertheless, quality competition of standardised platforms induces the highest investment and maximum welfare.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 257

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: two-sided markets ; standards ; investment in transaction quality ; Telekommunikationsnetz ; Produktqualität ; Investition ; Standardisierung ; Wettbewerbsbeschränkung ; Netzwerkökonomik ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Salim, Claudia
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (where): München
• (when): 2009

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13295
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94005
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13295-2
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET