Arbeitspapier

Organized Crime and the Bright Side of Subversion of Law

When Legislators introduce laws that award amnesties to 'low-rank' criminals co- operating with the justice, top criminals may bribe public officials to subvert the law. Legislators should anticipate this reaction and fight it back by introducing policies that bundle amnesties for low-rank criminals with amnesties to corrupt officials who plea guilty. In fact, the threat of being betrayed by their fellows may induce top-criminals to rely on corruption (to avoid sanctions). However, a suitable amnesty for corrupt officials may increase the conviction risk not only for top-criminal but also for low-rank ones. This domino effect can deter crime more than a policy based only on amnesties to low-rank criminals would: a bright side of subversion of law.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 39

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Criminal Law
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Thema
Criminal Organizations
Corruption
Leniency

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Gamba, Astrid
Immordino, Giovanni
Piccolo, Salvatore
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Gamba, Astrid
  • Immordino, Giovanni
  • Piccolo, Salvatore
  • Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE)

Entstanden

  • 2016

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