Arbeitspapier

Stability of linear stochastic difference equations in controlled random environments

We consider the stochastic sequence {Yi}t E N defined recursively by the linear relation Yt+l = AtYt + Bt in a random environment. The environment is described by the stochastic process {(At, Bt ) }t E N and is under the simultaneous control of several agents playing a discounted stochastic game. We formulate sufficient conditions on the game which ensure the existence of Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies which has the additional property that, in equilibrium, the process {Yt} t E N converges in distribution to a unique stationary sequence.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 2002,74

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Stochastic difference equation
stochastic stability
stochastic games
random systems with complete connections

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Horst, Ulrich
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2002

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10049409
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Horst, Ulrich
  • Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes

Time of origin

  • 2002

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