Arbeitspapier

Dynamic Common Agency, Vertical Integration, and Investment : The Economics of Movie Distribution

This paper analyzes the impact of vertical integration on investment and other strategies in a dynamic common agency framework. Movie distribution is used as a motivating example. The model matches several facts about movie distribution; distributors avoid head-to-head new hit releases, hits have longer runs than flops, and distributors receive the lion?s share of value generated by hits. Welfare comparisons show that integration is privately profitable and may improve social welfare even though it reduces industry profits. The effects of integration on strategies and welfare depend critically on how integration affects the bargaining power of the non-integrated firm.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Claremont Colleges Working Papers ; No. 2003-07

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Entertainment; Media
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Thema
common agency
exclusive dealing
entertainment
film
licensing
Vertikale Konzentration
Betriebliche Investitionspolitik
Verhandlungsmacht
Allokation
Filmwirtschaft
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Filson, Darren
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Claremont McKenna College, Department of Economics
(wo)
Claremont, CA
(wann)
2003

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Filson, Darren
  • Claremont McKenna College, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2003

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