Envy Freeness in Experimental Fair Division Problems

Arbeitspapier

In the recent experimental literature several social preference models have been suggested that address observed behavior not reducible to the pursuit of self-interest. Inequality aversion is one such model where preferences are distributional. Frequently, envy is suggested as the underlying rationale for inequality aversion. Envy is a central criterion in the theoretical literature on fair division, whose definition (Foley 1967) differs from the more casual use of the word in the experimental literature. We present and discuss results from free-form bargaining experiments on fair division problems where the role of envy in Foley’s sense can be analyzed and compared to social preferences. We find that envy freeness does matter as a secondary criterion.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 28/2004

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Relation of Economics to Social Values
• Subject: Fairness ; Envy Freeness ; Social Preferences ; Bargaining

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Herreiner, Dorothea K. ; Puppe, Clemens
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2004

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22905
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET