Ex-post implementation with social preferences

Artikel

The current literature on mechanism design in models with social preferences discusses social-preference-robust mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that are implementable in any environment with social preferences. The literature also discusses payoff-information-robust mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that are implementable for any belief and higher-order beliefs of the agents about the payoff types of the other agents. In the present paper, I address the question of whether deterministic mechanisms that are robust in both of these dimensions exist. I consider environments where each agent holds private information about his personal payoff and about the existence and extent of his social preferences. In such environments, a mechanism is robust in both dimensions only if it is ex-post implementable, i.e., only if incentive compatibility holds for every realization of payoff signals and for every realization of social preferences. I show that ex-post implementation of deterministic mechanisms is impossible in such environments; i.e., deterministic mechanisms that are both social-preference-robust and payoff-information-robust do not exist.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Social Choice and Welfare ; ISSN: 1432-217X ; Volume: 56 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 467-485 ; Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft
• Subject: Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods ; Public Finance ; International Political Economy ; Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences ; Social Policy

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Zik, Boaz
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Springer
• (where): Berlin, Heidelberg
• (when): 2020

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.1007/s00355-020-01291-x
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET