Wage inequality and skill asymmetries

Arbeitspapier

Using a simple model with two levels of skill, we assume that high-skill workers who fail to get high-skill jobs may accept low-skill positions; low-skill workers do not have the analogous option of filling high-skill positions. This asymmetry implies that an adverse, skill-neutral shock to aggregate employment may cause an increase in wage inequality, both between and within skill categories, as well as an increase in unemployment, especially among low-skill workers. Movements in productivity, unemployment and inequality may thus be linked to induced overeducation and credentialism.

Objekt anzeigen

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Working Paper ; No. 2004-03

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
• Thema: wage inequality ; unemployment ; skill-bias ; overeducation

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Skott, Peter ; Auerbach, Paul
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics
• (wo): Amherst, MA
• (wann): 2004

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/105730