Arbeitspapier

Fairness and Inequality in Institution Formation

A key solution for public good provision is the voluntary formation of institutions that commit players to cooperate. Such institutions generate inequality if some players decide not to participate but cannot be excluded from cooperation benefits. Prior research with small groups emphasizes the role of fairness concerns with positive effects on cooperation. We show that effects do not generalize to larger groups: if group size increases, groups are less willing to form institutions generating inequality. In contrast to smaller groups, however, this does not increase the number of participating players, thereby limiting the positive impact of institution formation on cooperation.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 16464

Classification
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Public Goods
Subject
institution formation
group size
social dilemma
social preferences

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Detemple, Julian
Kosfeld, Michael
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2023

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Detemple, Julian
  • Kosfeld, Michael
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2023

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