Social networks and wages in Senegal's labor market

Artikel

We develop a theoretical framework that considers the role played by moral hazard and the diversity of networks and cultures in the choice of hiring channel. In favoritism contexts social networks, and particularly strong ties, are adopted as hiring channels for unskilled jobs and result in wage penalties, while otherwise the opposite happens. We estimate an endogenous switching model for the case of Senegal's manufacturing formal sector and find, consistently with our theoretical predictions in case of favoritism, that informal hiring channels are preferred to fill unskilled vacancies and are associated with a wage penalty, especially when ties are stronger.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: IZA Journal of Labor & Development ; ISSN: 2193-9020 ; Volume: 2 ; Year: 2013 ; Pages: 1-26 ; Heidelberg: Springer

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development ; Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
• Thema: social networks ; hiring channel ; wage differential ; Lohnstruktur ; Qualifikation ; Konjunkturelle Arbeitslosigkeit ; Soziales Netzwerk ; Industrie ; Senegal

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Beradi, Nicoletta
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Springer
• (wo): Heidelberg
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.1186/2193-9020-2-3
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92292
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ