Arbeitspapier
A note on foreign bank entry and bank corporate governance in China
China employs a unique foreign bank entry model. Instead of allowing full foreign control of domestic banks, foreign investors are only permitted to be involved in the local banks as minority shareholders. At the same time, foreign strategic investors are expected to commit to bank corporate governance improvement and new technology support. In this context, the paper examines the effect of foreign strategic investors on Chinese bank performance. Based on a unique data set of bank ownership, performance, corporate governance and stock returns from 2003 to 2007, our regression and event study analysis results suggest that active involvement of foreign strategic investors in bank management have improved the corporate governance model of Chinese banks from a control based model to a market oriented model, and accordingly have promoted bank performance.
- ISBN
-
978-952-462-739-9
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: BOFIT Discussion Papers ; No. 8/2012
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Multinational Firms; International Business
- Thema
-
China
Foreign Market Entry
Corporate Governance
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hasan, Iftekhar
Xie, Ru
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT)
- (wo)
-
Helsinki
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hasan, Iftekhar
- Xie, Ru
- Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT)
Entstanden
- 2012
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