Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: First come, but second served?

Arbeitspapier

We analyze stability of self-enforcing climate agreements based on a data set generated by the CLIMNEG world simulation model (CWSM), version 1.2. We consider two new aspects which appear important in actual treaty-making. First, we consider a sequential coalition formation process where players can make proposals which are either accepted or countered by other proposals. Second, we analyze whether a moderator, like an international organization, even without enforcement power, can improve upon globally suboptimal outcomes through coordinating actions by making recommendations that must be Pareto-improving to all parties. We discuss the conceptual difficulties of implementing our algorithm.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 109.2009

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: Other ; International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods ; Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
• Subject: International Climate Agreements ; Sequential Coalition Formation ; Coordination through Moderator ; Integrated Assessment Model ; Algorithm for Computations

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Finus, Michael ; Rundshagen, Bianca ; Eyckmans, Johan
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53291
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET