Arbeitspapier

The Hidden Costs of Choice in the Labor Market

Freedom of choice is often thought to improve efficiency. We experimentally investigate the effect of giving workers a choice between compensation schemes with and without a CSR component (CSR/NoCSR) on labor market participation decision and work performance, compared to the alternative of exogenous assignment. Classical economic theory suggests that giving workers a choice should not reduce their performance. Our results show that there are hidden costs associated with the right of choice. When a worker is allowed to choose his or her compensation scheme, the labor market participation rate is significantly lower than when the same scheme is exogenously assigned. Work quality is also significantly lower for those who choose CSR, as well as for those who choose no CSR, than for those who are exogenously assigned to the same scheme.We propose a model of signaling with image concerns to explain why the freedom of choice may induce reduced participation and effort exertion of workers.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 16623

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility
Labor Economics: General
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Thema
choice
signaling
image concerns
corporate social responsibility
labor
experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Au, Pak Hung
Li, King King
Zhang, Qing
Zhu, Rong
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2023

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Au, Pak Hung
  • Li, King King
  • Zhang, Qing
  • Zhu, Rong
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2023

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