A comparative study of business lobbying in the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers

Arbeitspapier

The aim of this paper is to empirically test a theory of access that investigates the logic behind the apparent ad hoc lobbying behavior of business interests in the EU multi-level system. First, I propose the theoretical framework that attempts to explain the access of different organizational forms of business interest representation(companies, associations and consultants) to the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The degree of access to these institutions is explained in terms of a theory of supply and demand of access goods. Access goods concern information that is crucial in the EU policymaking process. In return for access to an EU institution, business interests have to provide the access good(s) demanded by that institution. I then derive a number of specific hypotheses about the access of the aforementioned organizational forms. These hypotheses are analyzed in an extensive empirical study of the EU financial services sector. On the basis of 126 exploratory and semi-structured interviews the hypotheses are checked across the three EU institutions.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: MPIfG Discussion Paper ; No. 02/7

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie, Anthropologie
• Subject: Interessenpolitik ; EU-Politik ; Theorie ; EU-Staaten ; Politische Entscheidung ; Soziale Beziehungen

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bouwen, Pieter
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung
• (where): Köln
• (when): 2002

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43177
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET