Rent Sharing Before and After the Wage Bill

Arbeitspapier

Many biases plague the estimation of rent sharing in labour markets. Using a Portuguese matched employer-employee panel, these biases are addressed in this paper in three complementary ways: 1) Controlling directly for the fact that firms that share more rents will, ceteris paribus, have lower net-of-wages profits. 2) Instrumenting profits via interactions between the exchange rate and the share of exports in firms? total sales. 3) Considering firm or firm/worker spell fixed effects and highlighting the role of downward wage rigidity. These approaches clarify conflicting findings in the literature and result, in our preferred specification, in a Lester range of pay dispersion of 56%, also shown to be robust to a number of competitive interpretations.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 1376

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials ; Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Panel Data Models; Spatio-temporal Models ; Labor Contracts
• Thema: rent sharing ; instrumental variables ; matched employer-employee data ; fixed effects ; Erfolgsbeteiligung ; Lohnbildung ; Lohnverhandlungstheorie ; Bias ; Schätzung ; Portugal

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Martins, Pedro Silva
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2004

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20672
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ