Arbeitspapier

Social Choice Theory: A Neglected Path to Possibility

Often preferences of agents are such that any sensible goal of the collective must admit a tie between all alternatives. The standard formulation in mechanism design demand that in this case all alternatives are equilibrium outcomes of the social choice mechanism. However, as far as the idea of an equilibrium is to predict the outcome of a game, we could just as well demand that there are no equilibria at all. Although this may seem innocent, and in a technical sense that's right, it is a neglected path to possibility.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Discussion paper ; No. 110

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Subject
Condorcet Criterion
Collective Decision Making
Implementation
Impossibility Result
Nash Equilibrium
Social Choice Theory

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ville, Korpela
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
(where)
Turku
(when)
2016

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ville, Korpela
  • Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)

Time of origin

  • 2016

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