Arbeitspapier

Social Choice Theory: A Neglected Path to Possibility

Often preferences of agents are such that any sensible goal of the collective must admit a tie between all alternatives. The standard formulation in mechanism design demand that in this case all alternatives are equilibrium outcomes of the social choice mechanism. However, as far as the idea of an equilibrium is to predict the outcome of a game, we could just as well demand that there are no equilibria at all. Although this may seem innocent, and in a technical sense that's right, it is a neglected path to possibility.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion paper ; No. 110

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Thema
Condorcet Criterion
Collective Decision Making
Implementation
Impossibility Result
Nash Equilibrium
Social Choice Theory

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ville, Korpela
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
(wo)
Turku
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ville, Korpela
  • Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)

Entstanden

  • 2016

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