Arbeitspapier
Social Choice Theory: A Neglected Path to Possibility
Often preferences of agents are such that any sensible goal of the collective must admit a tie between all alternatives. The standard formulation in mechanism design demand that in this case all alternatives are equilibrium outcomes of the social choice mechanism. However, as far as the idea of an equilibrium is to predict the outcome of a game, we could just as well demand that there are no equilibria at all. Although this may seem innocent, and in a technical sense that's right, it is a neglected path to possibility.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Discussion paper ; No. 110
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Subject
-
Condorcet Criterion
Collective Decision Making
Implementation
Impossibility Result
Nash Equilibrium
Social Choice Theory
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Ville, Korpela
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
- (where)
-
Turku
- (when)
-
2016
- Handle
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Ville, Korpela
- Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
Time of origin
- 2016