Konferenzbeitrag
Moving Towards a Single Labor Contract: Transition vs. Steady State
This paper analyzes the optimal design of a single open-ended contract (SOEC) and studies the political economy of moving towards such a SOEC in a dual labour market. We compare two economic environments: one with flexible entry-level jobs and high employment protection at long tenure, and another with a SOEC featuring employment protection levels that increase smoothly with tenure. For illustrative purposes, we specialize the discussion of such choices to Spain. A SOEC has the potential of bringing big time efficiency and welfare gains in a steady-state sense. We also identify winners and losers in the transitional path of such a reform and analyze its political support.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2015: Ökonomische Entwicklung - Theorie und Politik - Session: Public Economics - Theory I ; No. B14-V2
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Other
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Siassi, Nawid
Dolado, Juan J.
Lalé, Etienne
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wann)
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2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Konferenzbeitrag
Beteiligte
- Siassi, Nawid
- Dolado, Juan J.
- Lalé, Etienne
Entstanden
- 2015