Arbeitspapier

Serving consumers in an uncertain world: A credence goods experiment

Credence goods markets are prone to fraudulent behavior and market inefficiencies due to informational asymmetries between sellers and customers. We examine experimentally the effects of diagnostic uncertainty and insurance coverage on the information acquisition and provision decisions by sellers and the trading decisions by consumers. Our results reveal that diagnostic uncertainty is a major source of inefficiency by decreasing efficient service provision. Insurance coverage has a positive net effect on market efficiency, despite making information acquisition and efficient service provision less likely. We also examine the role of -s and of sellers' prosociality in shaping service provision and information acquisition.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion Papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2023/11

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
Thema
Credence goods
diagnostic uncertainty
insurance coverage
experiment

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Balafoutas, Loukas
Fornwagner, Helena
Kerschbamer, Rudolf
Sutter, Matthias
Tverdostup, Maryna
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2023

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Balafoutas, Loukas
  • Fornwagner, Helena
  • Kerschbamer, Rudolf
  • Sutter, Matthias
  • Tverdostup, Maryna
  • Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Entstanden

  • 2023

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