Arbeitspapier

Do low interest rates sow the seeds of financial crises?

A view advanced in the aftermath of the late-2000s financial crisis is that lower than optimal interest rates lead to excessive risk taking by financial intermediaries. We evaluate this view in a quantitative dynamic model where interest rate policy affects risk taking by changing the amount of safe bonds available as collateral for repo transactions. Given properly priced collateral, lower than optimal interest rates reduce risk taking. However, if intermediaries can augment their collateral by issuing assets whose risk is underestimated by rating agencies, lower than optimal interest rates contribute to excessive risk taking and amplify the severity of recessions.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: EPRI Working Paper ; No. 2012-1

Classification
Wirtschaft
Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
Monetary Policy
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: Financial Markets
Subject
financial intermediation
risk taking
optimal interest rate policy
capital regulation
Geldpolitik
Zinspolitik
Bankgeschäft
Risikofreude
Finanzmarktkrise
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Cociuba, Simona E.
Shukayev, Malik
Ueberfeldt, Alexander
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute (EPRI)
(where)
London (Ontario)
(when)
2012

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Cociuba, Simona E.
  • Shukayev, Malik
  • Ueberfeldt, Alexander
  • The University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute (EPRI)

Time of origin

  • 2012

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