Arbeitspapier

Speeding up reforms? Fragmentation and compensation payments in an experimental design

Reform delays emerge frequently in politics but can be solved using compensation payments. A higher degree of fragmentation among the addressees may- according to the theory- reduce these costs. The number of groups and the inherent uncertainty normally influence agents' behaviour. When this prediction holds and behaviour is in fact influenced by the number of groups, fragmentation will not outperform a less fragmented society concerning compensation costs. An experiment is conducted to evaluate the effects of fragmentation on agents' decisions and shows that the theoretic result as such cannot be applied to the behaviour of agents.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 139

Classification
Wirtschaft
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Subject
ultimatum game
compensation-payments
experiment
Politische Reform
Interessenvertretung
Kompensationslösung
Ultimatumspiel
Test

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ahlfeld, Corinna
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Volkswirtschaftliches Seminar
(where)
Göttingen
(when)
2008

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ahlfeld, Corinna
  • Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Volkswirtschaftliches Seminar

Time of origin

  • 2008

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