Arbeitspapier
Non-benevolent central banks
Corruption at central banks induces distorted policies by generating a tendency to increase inflation. An inflation bias arises because the public distrusts central bank's benevolence, not only its commitments. We show that distrust among the public, measured by a high level of expected inflation, can have positive effects because it may sanction a conservative central banker, forcing him to lower realized inflation levels. Giving central banks a high level of independence will fail if this not only insulates central bankers from troublesome political interference but also provides them with the leeway necessary to carry out corrupt transactions.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: cege Discussion Papers ; No. 16
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Thema
-
Corruption
central banks
time-inconsistency
inflation bias
seignorage
central bank independence
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lambsdorff, Johann
Schinke, Michael
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege)
- (wo)
-
Göttingen
- (wann)
-
2002
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lambsdorff, Johann
- Schinke, Michael
- University of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege)
Entstanden
- 2002
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