Arbeitspapier

Pooling, Pricing and Trading of Risks

Exchange of risks is considered here as a transferable-utility cooperative game. When the concerned agents are risk averse, there is a core imputation given by means of shadow prices on state-dependent claims. Like in finance, a risk can hardly be evaluated merely by its inherent statistical properties (in isolation from other risks). Rather, evaluation depends on the pooled risk and the convolution of individual preferences. Explored below are relations to finance with some emphasis on incompleteness. Included is a process of bilateral trade which converges to a price-supported core allocation.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 672

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Flåm, Sjur Didrik
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2002

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Flåm, Sjur Didrik
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2002

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