Arbeitspapier
Too cool for school? Signaling and countersignaling
In signaling environments ranging from consumption to education, high quality senders often shun the standard signals that should separate them from lower quality senders. We find that allowing for additional, noisy information on sender quality permits equilibria where medium types signal to separate themselves from low types, but high types then choose to not signal or countersignal. High types not only save costs by relying on the additional information to stochastically separate them from low types, but countersignaling itself is a signal of confidence which separates high types from medium types. Experimental results confirm that subjects can learn to countersignal.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Claremont Colleges Working Papers in Economics ; No. 1999-21
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Subject
-
signaling
countersignaling
understatement
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Feltovich, Nick
Harbaugh, Rick
To, Ted
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Claremont McKenna College, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Claremont, CA
- (when)
-
1999
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Feltovich, Nick
- Harbaugh, Rick
- To, Ted
- Claremont McKenna College, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 1999
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