Deciding whether a law is constitutional, interpretable, or unconstitutional

Artikel

A high court has to decide whether a lawis constitutional, unconstitutional, or interpretable. The voting system is runoff. Runoff voting systems can be interpreted both, as social choice functions or as mechanisms. It is known that, for universal domains of preferences, runoff voting systems have several drawbacks as social choice functions. Although in our setting the preferences are restricted to be singlepeaked over three alternatives, these problems persist. Runoff mechanisms are not well-behaved either: they do not implement any Condorcet consistent social choice function in undominated subgame perfect Nash equilibria. We show, however, that some Condorcet consistent social choice functions can be implemented in dominant strategies via other simple and natural mechanisms.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association ; ISSN: 1869-4195 ; Volume: 3 ; Year: 2012 ; Issue: 1/2 ; Pages: 1-14 ; Heidelberg: Springer

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
• Thema: runoff voting system ; Condorcet consistency ; strategy-proofness ; implementation theory ; Wahlsystem ; Condorcet-Paradoxon ; Nash-Gleichgewicht ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Neue politische Ökonomie ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Amorós, Pablo ; Martínez, Ricardo ; Moreno, Bernardo ; Puy, M. Socorro
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Springer
• (wo): Heidelberg
• (wann): 2012

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.1007/s13209-011-0039-6
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/77739
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ