Pension and children: Pareto improvement with heterogeneous preferences

Arbeitspapier

In an overlapping-generations model with endogenous birth rates, I design a reform of the pay-as-you-go pension system, which internalises positive externalities of children - their pension contributions. Individuals may differ in their preferences for children and their ability to have children at all. They can choose between the status-quo flat-rate benefits and a new system, in which they get just the benefits that are (on average) financed by their own children, reduced by an amount which is used to subsidise the flat-rate system. Whereas people with low child preferences keep the status quo, people with high child preferences choose the individualised system, having the optimal incentives to raise children and a higher utility.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IAB-Discussion Paper ; No. 3/2006

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Social Security and Public Pensions ; Demographic Trends, Macroeconomic Effects, and Forecasts ; Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth ; Retirement; Retirement Policies
• Thema: Rentenreform - Modell ; Rentenhöhe ; Rentenanpassung ; Rentenunterschied ; Rentenversicherung ; Eltern ; Rentner ; Kinderlosigkeit ; Kinderzahl ; Rente - Finanzierung ; Versorgungsausgleich ; Lebensstandard ; Generationenvertrag ; Familienpolitik ; demografische Faktoren ; Rentenpolitik

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gaggermeier, Christian
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB)
• (wo): Nürnberg
• (wann): 2006

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31912
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ