Arbeitspapier

Is the notification of monitoring a threat to the unemployed?: a regression discontinuity approach

In July 2004, the Belgian government intensified monitoring within the Unemployment Insurance scheme. Workers claiming unemployment benefits for more than 13 months are notified that past job-search behavior will be monitored 8 months later. In one region the target group is counselled shortly after the notification, while in others not or only once the monitoring has taken place. We exploit the discontinuity in the treatment assignment at the age of 30 to evaluate the threat effect of the notification on the probability of employment. We find that the effect is heterogeneous and critically depends on whether and when notified workers are counselled.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2042

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies: Public Policy
Project Evaluation; Social Discount Rate
Thema
Arbeitslosenversicherung
Arbeitsverwaltung
Kontrolle
Arbeitsuche
Wirtschaftspolitische Wirkungsanalyse
Berufliche Integration
Schätzung
Belgien

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Cockx, Bart Leo Wim
Dejemeppe, Muriel
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Cockx, Bart Leo Wim
  • Dejemeppe, Muriel
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2007

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