Arbeitspapier
Worker self-selection and the profits from cooperation
We investigate a competitive labor market with team production. Workers differ in their motivation to exert team effort and types are private information. We show that there can exist a separating equilibrium in which workers self-select into different firms and firms employing cooperative workers make strictly positive profits. Profit differences across firms persist because cooperation strictly increases output and worker separation requires firms employing cooperative workers to pay out weakly lower wages.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 3881
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
Team work
self-selection
Gruppenarbeit
Arbeitsmarkttheorie
Asymmetrische Information
Arbeitsuche
Arbeitsnachfrage
Wettbewerb
Gewinn
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kosfeld, Michael
von Siemens, Ferdinand
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-20081217231
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kosfeld, Michael
- von Siemens, Ferdinand
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2008
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