Worker self-selection and the profits from cooperation

Arbeitspapier

We investigate a competitive labor market with team production. Workers differ in their motivation to exert team effort and types are private information. We show that there can exist a separating equilibrium in which workers self-select into different firms and firms employing cooperative workers make strictly positive profits. Profit differences across firms persist because cooperation strictly increases output and worker separation requires firms employing cooperative workers to pay out weakly lower wages.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 3881

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Subject: Team work ; self-selection ; Gruppenarbeit ; Arbeitsmarkttheorie ; Asymmetrische Information ; Arbeitsuche ; Arbeitsnachfrage ; Wettbewerb ; Gewinn ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kosfeld, Michael ; von Siemens, Ferdinand
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2008

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/35779
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-20081217231
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET