Arbeitspapier

Monetary policy transmission in segmented markets

We show that dealer market power impedes the pass-through of monetary policy in repo markets, which is an important first stage of monetary policy transmission. In the European repo market, most participants do not have access to trade on centralized exchanges. Rather, they rely on OTC intermediation by a small number of dealers that exhibit significant market power. As a result, the passthrough of the ECB's policy rate to the majority of non-dealer banks and non-banks is inefficient and unequal in repo markets. Our estimates imply that a secured funding facility like the Fed's RRP may alleviate dealer market power and improve the transmission efficiency of monetary policy to banks and non-bank financial institutions.

ISBN
978-92-899-5291-0
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 2706

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
monetary policy
pass-through efficiency
non-banks
repo market
market power

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Eisenschmidt, Jens
Ma, Yiming
Zhang, Anthony Lee
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
European Central Bank (ECB)
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2022

DOI
doi:10.2866/691877
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
01.07.2032, 01:00 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Eisenschmidt, Jens
  • Ma, Yiming
  • Zhang, Anthony Lee
  • European Central Bank (ECB)

Entstanden

  • 2022

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