Arbeitspapier
Risk-Neutrality and Strategic Insurance
The paper shows that Legal Cost Insurance (LCI) is a device to enhance potential litigants? bargaining position rather than to re-allocate risk. Being insured decreases the cost an insured party has to bear if settlement negotiations fail and the case goes to trial. This shifts the threat points, which has an impact on the bargaining result. In negative expected value suits, LCI can make the threat to sue credible and motivate potential defendants to make positive settlement offers. Hence, even risk-neutral agents may find it beneficial to insure.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CSLE Discussion Paper ; No. 99-02
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
Litigation Process
- Thema
-
Civil Procedure
Bargaining
Settlement
Negative Expected Value Suits
Zivilprozess
Verhandlungstheorie
Rechtsschutzversicherung
Risikoneutralität
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kirstein, Roland
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE)
- (wo)
-
Saarbrücken
- (wann)
-
1999
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:24 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kirstein, Roland
- Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE)
Entstanden
- 1999