Overwhelmed by Routine Tasks: A Multi-Tasking Principle Agent Perspective

Arbeitspapier

We analyze a multitasking model with a verifiable routine task and a skill-dependent activity characterized by moral hazard. Contracts negotiated by firm/employee pairs follow from Nash bargaining. High- and low-skilled employees specialize, intermediate productivity employees perform both tasks. Compared to the efficient solution, more employees exert both tasks and effort in the routine task is inefficiently large. As work overload in the routine task is decoupled from a corresponding increase in remuneration, employees perceive a loss of control to allocate effort between the two tasks. Reductions in employees' bargaining power and improvements in monitoring technologies aggravate the issue.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9753

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Economics of Contract: Theory ; Labor Contracts ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
• Subject: multi-tasking ; work overload ; routine tasks ; rent extraction ; moral hazard ; limited liability ; Nash Bargaining

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Demougin, Dominique ; Helm, Carsten
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2022

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/263683
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET