Arbeitspapier

The Excess Power Puzzle of the EU Budget

It is a constant topic of debate how the European Union (EU) spends the money it collects from its member states. This paper supports the idea that the EU budget battle involves one-shot games that have persistent impacts on the budget allocations. In one way or the other, the member states are able to establish rules or contracts that restrict the budget allocation in advance. In the current status quo, France and Spain are the clearest winners of these restrictions, while Austria, Finland and Sweden, not to mention the new member states, suffer largest losses.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Discussion paper ; No. 45

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Thema
EU budget
voting power

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kauppi, Heikki
Widgrén, Mika
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
(wo)
Turku
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kauppi, Heikki
  • Widgrén, Mika
  • Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)

Entstanden

  • 2009

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