Arbeitspapier
The Excess Power Puzzle of the EU Budget
It is a constant topic of debate how the European Union (EU) spends the money it collects from its member states. This paper supports the idea that the EU budget battle involves one-shot games that have persistent impacts on the budget allocations. In one way or the other, the member states are able to establish rules or contracts that restrict the budget allocation in advance. In the current status quo, France and Spain are the clearest winners of these restrictions, while Austria, Finland and Sweden, not to mention the new member states, suffer largest losses.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion paper ; No. 45
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Thema
-
EU budget
voting power
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kauppi, Heikki
Widgrén, Mika
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
- (wo)
-
Turku
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kauppi, Heikki
- Widgrén, Mika
- Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE)
Entstanden
- 2009