- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Journal: Theoretical Economics; ISSN: 1555-7561; Volume: 10; Year: 2015; Issue: 2; Pages: 341-383
Bezug (was)
Wirtschaft
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Coase conjecture
bargaining
durable goods monopoly
incomplete information
price formation
transparency
Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Coase conjecture
bargaining
durable goods monopoly
incomplete information
price formation
transparency
Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
Kaya, Ayça
Liu, Qingmin
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley
Liu, Qingmin
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley
Erschienen
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley
- Rechteinformation
-
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
18.10.2021, 08:58 MESZ
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Kaya, Ayça
- Liu, Qingmin
- Hoboken, NJ: Wiley
Entstanden
- Hoboken, NJ: Wiley
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