Artikel

The importance of being honest

This paper analyzes the case of a principal who wants to provide an agent with proper incentives to explore a hypothesis that can be either true or false. The agent can shirk, thus never proving the hypothesis, or he can avail himself of a known technology to produce fake successes. This latter option either makes the provision of incentives for honesty impossible or does not distort its costs at all. In the latter case, the principal will optimally commit to rewarding later successes even though he only cares about the first one. Indeed, after an honest success, the agent is more optimistic about his ability to generate further successes. This, in turn, provides incentives for the agent to be honest before a first success.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 11 ; Year: 2016 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 773-811 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: Other
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Thema
Dynamic moral hazard
continuous-time principal-agent models
optimal incentive scheme
experimentation
bandit models
Poisson process
Bayesian learning

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Klein, Nicolas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New Haven, CT
(wann)
2016

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE1913
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Klein, Nicolas
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2016

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