Arbeitspapier

Why managers hold shares of their firm: An empirical analysis

We examine the relationship between CEO ownership and stock market performance of S&P 500 (S&P 1500) firms from 1994-2005 (1996-2005). We find that firms in which the CEO holds a considerable share of outstanding stocks outperform the market by up to 16% p.a. after controlling for traditional risk factors like size, book-to-market and momentum. This offers an explanation why so many CEOs hold a large fraction of their own company's stocks. They do so simply because it pays. We also examine several potential explanations why the existence of an owner CEO is not fully priced but leads to abnormal returns.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CFR Working Paper ; No. 06-11

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
Corporate Finance and Governance: General
Thema
CEO-Ownership
Asset Pricing with large shareholders

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
von Lilienfeld-Toal, Ulf
Ruenzi, Stefan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)
(wo)
Cologne
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • von Lilienfeld-Toal, Ulf
  • Ruenzi, Stefan
  • University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR)

Entstanden

  • 2006

Ähnliche Objekte (12)