Transboundary Fisheries Management under Implementation Uncertainty

Arbeitspapier

This paper examines how non-binding co-operative agreements on marine fisheries management can be sustained when management plans in participating countries are implemented with error. The effects of implementation uncertainty on voluntary co-operation are compared to those of recruitment uncertainty. A self-enforcing co-operative solution can only be sustained when uncertainty is not too pronounced. Even when a co-operative agreement can be achieved, frequent phases of reversion to non-co-operative harvest levels are needed to support the agreement. The implications of recruitment uncertainty for implicit co-operation are less detrimental than those of implementation uncertainty.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 118.2003

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Renewable Resources and Conservation: Fishery; Aquaculture ; Noncooperative Games
• Subject: Fisheries management ; Transboundary fisheries ; Non-cooperative games ; Implementation uncertainty ; Fischerei ; Bioökonomik ; Internationale Zusammenarbeit ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Laukkanen, Marita
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118144
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET