Enforce tax compliance, but cautiously: The role of trust in authorities and power of authorities

Arbeitspapier

The "Slippery Slope Framework" hypothesizes that (an individual's) tax compliance is determined by both the tax authority's powerfulness and its trustworthiness, and that the two dimensions moderate each other. By employing a within-country fixed effects analysis for 25 European countries, this paper tests the conjecture that a slippery slope exists also on the aggregate level. Results show that both trust and power are positively correlated with higher tax compliance. Trust and power also moderate each other: the lower trust, the greater the compliance-increasing impact of power. However, the positive effect decreases with increasing coercion. Strong deterrence policies may eventually damage tax compliance.

Objekt anzeigen

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Hannover Economic Papers (HEP) ; No. 589

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Fiscal Policy ; Tax Evasion and Avoidance ; Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: General
• Thema: Tax compliance ; Slippery Slope Framework ; trust ; power ; institutions

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Tsikas, Stefanos A.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
• (wo): Hannover
• (wann): 2017

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/172843