Arbeitspapier
The Evolutionary Stability of Optimism, Pessimism and Complete Ignorance
We provide an evolutionary foundation to evidence that in some situations humans maintain optimistic or pessimistic attitudes towards uncertainty and are ignorant to relevant aspects of the environment. Players in strategic games face Knightian uncertainty about opponents' actions and maximize individually their Choquet expected utility. Our Choquet expected utility model allows for both an optimistic or pessimistic attitude towards uncertainty as well as ignorance to strategic dependencies. An optimist (resp. pessimist) overweights good (resp. bad) outcomes. A complete ignorant never reacts to opponents' change of actions. With qualifications we show that optimistic (resp. pessimistic) complete ignorance is evolutionary stable / yields a strategic advantage in submodular (resp. supermodular) games with aggregate externalities. Moreover, this evolutionary stable preference leads to Walrasian behavior in those classes of games.
- Sprache
- 
                Englisch
 
- Erschienen in
- 
                Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 68
 
- Klassifikation
- 
                Wirtschaft
 Noncooperative Games
 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
 Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
 Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
 Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
 Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
 
- Thema
- 
                ambiguity
 Knightian uncertainty
 Choquet expected utility
 neo-additive capacity
 Hurwicz criterion
 Maximin
 Minimax
 Ellsberg paradox
 overconfidence
 supermodularity
 aggregative games
 monotone comparative statics
 playing the field
 evolution of preferences
 
- Ereignis
- 
                Geistige Schöpfung
 
- (wer)
- 
                Schipper, Burkhard C.
 
- Ereignis
- 
                Veröffentlichung
 
- (wer)
- 
                Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
 
- (wo)
- 
                München
 
- (wann)
- 
                2005
 
- DOI
- 
                
                    
                        doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13482
- Handle
- URN
- 
                
                    
                        urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13482-6
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 
                
                    
                        10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Schipper, Burkhard C.
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Entstanden
- 2005
 
        
     
        
     
        
    