Arbeitspapier

Floor systems and the Friedman rule: The fiscal arithmetic of open market operations

In a floor system of monetary policy implementation, the central bank remunerates bank reserves at or near the market rate of interest. Some observers have expressed concern that operating such a system will have adverse fiscal consequences for the public sector and may even require the government to subsidize the central bank. We show that this is not the case. Using the monetary general equilibrium model of Berentsen et al. (2014), we show how a central bank that supplies reserves through open market operations can always generate non-negative net income, even when using a floor system to implement the Friedman rule.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Staff Report ; No. 754

Classification
Wirtschaft
Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems
Monetary Policy
Central Banks and Their Policies
Subject
monetary policy implementation
central bank operations
interest on reserves

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Keister, Todd
Martin, Antoine
McAndrews, James
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(where)
New York, NY
(when)
2015

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Keister, Todd
  • Martin, Antoine
  • McAndrews, James
  • Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Time of origin

  • 2015

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