Arbeitspapier

China as a regulatory state

Market economy models differ in the degree of the power of the government vis-à-vis the market in the economy. Under the classications set forth by Glaeser and Shleifer (2002, 2003), and Djankov et al. (2003), these market models range from those emphasizing low government intervention in the market (private orderings and private litigation through courts) to those where the state is an active participant (regulatory state). This paper, using data from a survey of 3,073 private enterprises in China, constructs an index to quantify the power of the government vis-à-vis the market. Regional government power is found to vary considerably across China's regions. Notably, enterprises located in regions where government exerts more power in the market perform better, suggesting that the regulatory state model of the market economy is appropriate for China.

ISBN
978-952-462-989-8
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: BOFIT Discussion Papers ; No. 17/2009

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Du, Julan
Lu, Yi
Tao, Zhigang
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT)
(wo)
Helsinki
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Du, Julan
  • Lu, Yi
  • Tao, Zhigang
  • Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT)

Entstanden

  • 2009

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