Social Categories and Group Preference Disputes: The Aversion to Winner-Take-All Solutions

Journal article | Zeitschriftenartikel

Six studies explored the hypothesis that third parties are averse to resolving preference disputes with winner-take-all solutions when disputing factions belong to different social categories (e.g. gender, nationality, firms, etc.) versus the same social category. Studies 1—3 showed that third parties' aversion to winner-take-all solutions, even when they are based on the unbiased toss of a coin, is greater when the disputed preferences correlate with social category membership than when they do not. Studies 4—6 suggested that reluctance to resolve inter-category disputes in a winner-take-all manner is motivated by a desire to minimize the affective disparity—the hedonic gap—between the winning and losing sides. The implication is that winner-take-all outcomes, even those that satisfy conditions of procedural fairness, become unacceptable when disputed preferences cleave along social category lines.

Object Details

• Extent: Seite(n): 581-593
• Language: Englisch
• Notes: Status: Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 10(4)

Classification and Topics

• Subject: behavioral economics; competition; decision-making; distributive justice; group disputes; social categories; social comparison;

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Garcia, Stephen M. ; Miller, Dale T.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (when): 2007

Further information

• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430207084721
• URN: urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-228460
• Rights: GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
• Last update: 21.06.2024, 4:27 PM CEST