Arbeitspapier

“Almost” Subsidy-free Spatial Pricing in a Multi-dimensional Setting

Consider a population of citizens uniformly spread over the entire plane, that faces a problem of locating public facilities to be used by its members. The cost of every facility is financed by its users, who also face an idiosyncratic private access cost to the facility. We assume that the facilities’ cost is independent of location and access costs are linear with respect to the Euclidean distance. We show that an external intervention that covers 0.19% of the facility cost is sufficient to guarantee secession-proofness or no cross-subsidization, where no group of individuals is charged more than its stand alone cost incurred if it had acted on its own. Moreover, we demonstrate that in this case the Rawlsian access pricing is the only secession-proof allocation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 68.2007

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
Thema
Secession-Proofness
Optimal Jurisdictions
Rawlsian Allocation
Hexagonal Partition
Cross-Subsidization
Öffentliche Einrichtung
Standortwahl
Allokation
Rawls-Gerechtigkeitstheorie
Entscheidungstheorie
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Savvateev, Alexei
Drèze, Jacques
Le Breton, Michel
Weber, Shlomo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Savvateev, Alexei
  • Drèze, Jacques
  • Le Breton, Michel
  • Weber, Shlomo
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2007

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