Arbeitspapier

Blowing the Whistle

Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, theoretically and experimentally.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 9/2003

Classification
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Subject
Anti-trust
leniency
immunity
amnesty
blow the whistle
cartels
pricecompetition
Bertrand model
experiment
communication
Wettbewerbspolitik
Kartellverfahren
Straffreiheit
Preiswettbewerb
Experiment

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Apesteguia, José
Dufwenberg, Martin
Selten, Reinhard
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2003

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Apesteguia, José
  • Dufwenberg, Martin
  • Selten, Reinhard
  • University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Time of origin

  • 2003

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