Arbeitspapier
Blowing the Whistle
Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, theoretically and experimentally.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 9/2003
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
- Subject
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Anti-trust
leniency
immunity
amnesty
blow the whistle
cartels
pricecompetition
Bertrand model
experiment
communication
Wettbewerbspolitik
Kartellverfahren
Straffreiheit
Preiswettbewerb
Experiment
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Apesteguia, José
Dufwenberg, Martin
Selten, Reinhard
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
- (where)
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Bonn
- (when)
-
2003
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Apesteguia, José
- Dufwenberg, Martin
- Selten, Reinhard
- University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
Time of origin
- 2003