Arbeitspapier
Optimal taxation under different concepts of justness
A common assumption in the optimal taxation literature is that the social planner maximizes a welfarist social welfare function with weights decreasing with income. However, high transfer withdrawal rates in many countries imply very low weights for the working poor in practice. We extend the optimal taxation framework by Saez (2002) to allow for alternatives to welfarism. We calculate weights of a social planner's function as implied by the German tax and transfer system based on the concepts of welfarism, minimum absolute and minimum relative sacrifice. We find that the minimum absolute sacrifice principle is in line with social weights that decline with net income.
- ISBN
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978-3-86788-888-2
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Ruhr Economic Papers ; No. 762
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Welfare Economics: General
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
- Thema
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justness
optimal taxation
income redistribution
equal sacrifice
inequality
subjective preferences
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Jessen, Robin
Metzing, Maria
Rostam-Afschar, Davud
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
- (wo)
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Essen
- (wann)
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2018
- DOI
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doi:10.4419/86788888
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Jessen, Robin
- Metzing, Maria
- Rostam-Afschar, Davud
- RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
Entstanden
- 2018