Arbeitspapier

Carbon is Forever: a Climate Change Experiment on Cooperation

Greenhouse gases generate impacts that can last longer than human civilization itself. Such persistence may affect the behavioral ability to cooperate. Here we study mitigation efforts within a framework that reflects key features of climate change and then contrasts a dynamic versus a static setting. In a treatment with persistence, the pollution cumulates and generates damages over time while in another treatment it has only immediate effects and then disappears. We find that cooperation is not hampered, on average, by pollution persistence. Mitigation efforts, though, should not be delayed, because cooperation levels appear to deteriorate for high stocks of pollution.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 1065

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Design of Experiments: General
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Calzolari, Giacomo
Casari, Marco
Ghidoni, Riccardo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(wo)
Bologna
(wann)
2016

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5098
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Calzolari, Giacomo
  • Casari, Marco
  • Ghidoni, Riccardo
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Entstanden

  • 2016

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