Negative intra-group externalities in two-sided markets

Arbeitspapier

Two types of agents interact on a pre-existing free platform. Agents value positively the presence of agents of the other type but may value negatively the presence of agents of their own type. We ask whether a new platform can find fees and subsidies so as to divert agents from the existing platform and make a profit. We show that this might be impossible if intragroup negative externalities are sufficiently (but not too) strong with respect to positive intergroup externalities.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2011

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Organization of Production
• Subject: Marktstruktur ; Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung ; Externer Effekt ; Oligopol ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Belleflamme, Paul ; Toulemonde, Eric
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2007

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26056
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET