Arbeitspapier
Negative intra-group externalities in two-sided markets
Two types of agents interact on a pre-existing free platform. Agents value positively the presence of agents of the other type but may value negatively the presence of agents of their own type. We ask whether a new platform can find fees and subsidies so as to divert agents from the existing platform and make a profit. We show that this might be impossible if intragroup negative externalities are sufficiently (but not too) strong with respect to positive intergroup externalities.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2011
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Organization of Production
- Thema
-
Marktstruktur
Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung
Externer Effekt
Oligopol
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Belleflamme, Paul
Toulemonde, Eric
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Belleflamme, Paul
- Toulemonde, Eric
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2007